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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
the Court reasoned that the legislature had intended this crime to be
included as an unlawful gain. 4
The exercise of certain legislative functions by the court is an inescapa.
ble product of the judicial process of determining congressional intent,
But this must be clearly distinguished from the instances where the court
changes its previous interpretation. There, the result is not merely a
necessary consequence of the judicial process, but if proper weight is not
given to congressional silence, becomes judicial legislation." Because
the court's original construction of this section of the Internal Revenue
Code allowed the embezzler in some instances to set up his crime to defeat
the tax,20 national debate following27 the decision stimulated discussion of
the possibility of law enforcement through the tax power.28  But in the six
year period following this decision Congress did not act to establish
such a policy.
29
It is submitted that the construction in the instant case is judicial
legislation and has the effect of placing the federal government, through
the use of the tax power, on the state level of criminal law enforcement.
30
Whether federal law enforcement through the use of the tax power would
be a benefit to the federal system would be a policy decision of such major
importance that it clearly rests with Congress.3' The present Court,3 2 by
exercising a legislative function, continues to place upon Congress the
affirmative duty to act explicitly on every judicial construction of its
statutes.
INFANTS - AGE DETERMINING JURISDICTION OVER ACTS
OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS - FEDERAL JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY ACT
Defendant was charged with the unlawful possession of counterfeit
currency.' He moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the court
24. Note that neither the Wilcox nor the Rutkin Case affect the taxation of funds
from illegal ventures because in most states, the other party, being in pari delicto, has no
legal right to recover the money. fohnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943) (num-
be- syndicate); United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (illegal liquor traffic).
IC Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20 (1933).
26. McCue v. Comm'r, March 4, 1946 Memo. Op., Dkts. 233, 315, 464, CCH Fed.
Tar Rep. 7343 (in).
" See Note, 25 TEx. L. REv. 693 (1947); Note, 46 CoL. L. Rav. 677 (1946).
28. Note, 48 COL. L. REv. 100 (1948).
29. Stevenson-Chislett, Inc. v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Pa. 1951)
(Crrgress allowed deduction of loss by victim).
30. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1903).
31. See dissent of Stone, C. f. in Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70 (1946).
32. See Palmer, Dissents and Overulings, 34 A.B.A.J. 554 (1948) (failure of con-
sistent application of the extrinsic aid of congressional silence is one of the major factors
splitting our presently divided court).
1. 62 STAT. 705 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1951) (uttering counterfeit obligations oi
securities); 62 STAT. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 371 1951) (conspiracy to commit offense
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lacked jurisdiction to try him since he was under eighteen years of age at the
time of committing the act. Held, the age at the time of the commission of
the offense rather than the age at the time of indictment determines whether
or not one is a juvenile.2 United States v. Fotto, 103 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.
N.Y. 1952).
The first juvenile court act s was enacted in Illinois in 18994 and now
all states have similar acts, although modified'and improved. Great Britain
and Canada adopted juvenile court laws in 1908.- The Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act was passed in 1938,1 following the first United States Fed-
eral Statute on Juvenile Offenders in 1932. The theory of these acts looks
toward reclamation and reformation rather than punishment for juvenile
offenders. In some states the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction on the
theory that an infant committing an offense commits no crime but mere de-
linquency, thereby changing the common law.7  The New York statute
actually provides this.8 Other states grant the juvenile courts concurrent or
qualified jurisdiction on the theory that although the offense is a crime the
procedure should aim at reformation rather than punishment.9 Crimes
punishable by death or life imprisonment are, in some statutes, not under the
juvenile court jurisdiction. 10
Determination of the conflict on the question of which age is control-
ling rests mainly on the wording of the statutory provisions of the Act in
the various jurisdictions. Among the states which have ruled on the ques-
tion, there is a slight majority favoring the age at the time charged." In line
or to defraud United States); 62 STAT. 705 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 473 (1951) (dealing in
counterfeit obligations or securities).
2. 62 STAT. 857 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1951) (for the purposes of this chapter
a "juvenile" is a person who has not attained his eighteenth birthday, and "juvenile delin-
quency" is the violation of a law of the United States committed by a juvenile and not
punishable by death or life imprisonment).
3. At common law an infant under seven was conclusively presumed incapable of
committing a crime; as to a child between the ages of seven and fourteen the presump-
tion became rebuttable; for a child over the age of fourteen there was no presumption of
incapacity. 4 BL. COMM. *24.
4. ILL. LAws 1899, p. 131, § 1 et seq.; 2, ABBOTT, THE CHILD AND THE STATE 332
(1938).
5. The Children's Act, 1908, 8 EDw. 7, c. 67 (superseded later by other acts); ruve-
nile Delinquents Act, 1908, CAN. STATS., Cap. 40 (superseded by Juvenile Delinquency
Act of 1929).
6. 52 STAT. 764, 765, 766 (1938); 18 U.S.C. § 5031 et seq. (1951).
7. State v. Dubray, 121 Kan. 886, 250 Pac. 316 (1926) (character of crime is deter-
mined by age of offender and does not change from delinquency to crime).
8. N.Y. DOM. REL. CT. ACT. § 61, subd. 1 (amended by L. 1940, c. 671 § 3, L. 1941,
c. 943, § 3) (The Children's Court).
9. Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 297 Pac. 1029 (1931) (decision based on Arrendell
v. State); Arrendell v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 350, 131 S.W. 1096, 1097 (1910) (juvenile
statutes affect treatment of juveniles and not capacity for crime).
10. 62 STAT. 857 (1948); 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1951); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2814 (Burns
1933); Miller v. Superintendent of Indiana Boys' School, 209 Ind. 115, 198 N.E. 66
(1935).
11. Ala., Ariz., Iowa, Mich., Miss., Mo., N.J., Ohio, R.I., Texas, Wash.
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with this in Scopillitti v. State12 the court opined that it was not the legisla-
tive intent to change the common law, and that the purpose of the Act was
to reform the juvenile during his juvenility. In other opinions courts have
expressed the fear that to allow the governing age to be that at the time of
commission of the offense would bar prosecution in many cases." A num-
ber of statutes expressly state the offender must be a juvenile at the time the
action is brought;14 and many 'statutes place it within the discretion of either
court to decide whether the offender shall be tried as a criminal or a
delinquent.' 5
The conflicting interpretations parallel each other from the earliest
cases to the present.10 In some of the states which have held that the age
at the time of commission of the act is determinative, 7 the statutes clearly
state that once the juvenile court has jurisdiction it retains jurisdiction al-
though the offender no longer is within the age limit.'8  In other states,
the reasoning is that mere delinquency cannot become crime because of the
passage of time.'9 Numerous courts hold the purpose of the juvenile act to
be reformation rather than creation of a separate tribunal for juveniles;
20
and a few decisions are based on the apprehension that to allow the action
to be deferred until the child is beyond the statutory age and therefore liable
to criminal prosecution would defeat the purpose of the Act.2'
In the instant case great weight is placed by the court on the wording of
the Federal Act 22 as a strong indication of legislative intention that the Act
should apply to one a juvenile at the time the offense was committed.
12. 41 Ohio App. 221, 180 N.E. 740 (1932); noted, 10 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 397 (1933).
Cf., State ex rel. Heth v. Moloney, Sheriff, 126 Ohio St. 526, 186 N.E. 362 (1933).
13. People v. Ross, 235 Mich. 433, 209 N.W. 663 (1926) (crime of murder), but
many statutes except from juvenile court jurisdiction crimes punishable by life imprison-
ment or death.
14. Ex parte Albiniano, 62 R.I. 429, 6 A.2d 554 (1939).
15. State ex rel. Boyd v. Rutledge, 321 Mo. 1090, 13 S.W.2d 1061 (1929).
16. Holding that age at time of charge controls: Arrendell v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R.
350, 131 S.W. 1096, 1097 (1910); Stracner v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 89, 215 S.W. 305
(1919); Peterson v. State, 235 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1950). Holding that
age at time of offense controls: Sams v. State, 133 Tenn. 188, 180 S.W. 173 (1915);
Mattingly v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 222, 188 S.W. 370 (1916); State v. Musser, 110
Utah 534, 175 P.2d 724 (1946).
17. Ind., Kan., Ky., La., N.C., Ohio, Tenn., Utah.
18. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(3) (1951); FLA. STAT. § 39.01(11) (1951); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 14-7-4, 14-7-6 (1943); State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 175 P.2d 724 (1946); State
ex rel. Heth v. Moloney, Sheriff, 126 Ohio St. 526, 186 N.E. 362 (1933); Waybright,
Florida's New Juvenile Court Act, 6 MIAMI L.Q. 3 (1951) (statute provides for juvenile
jurisdiction of one a child at the time the offense was committed and makes it discretion-
ary with the juvenile court to transfer to the criminal court a child over 13 years old if he
is charged with the commission of what would be a felony if committed by an adult, and
transfer of a child over 15 who commits a capital offense) (These ages are actually 14
and 16 in the statute).
19. State v. Dubray, 121 Kan. 886, 250 Pac. 316 (1926).
20. State v. Malone, 156 La. 617, 100 So. 788 (1924), overruling State v. Ebarbo,
143 La. 591, 78 So. 793 (1918).
21. Mattingly v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 222, 188 S.W. 370 (1916).
22. 62 STAT. 857 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1951), United States v. Fotto, 103 F.
Supp. 430, 431 (S.D. N.Y. 1952) (... 'juvenile delinquency' is the violation of a law
* * * committed by a juvenile).
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Had the intention been otherwise Congress would not have failed to state
the determinative date. The court finds little to fear from the results of
non-apprehension of an offender until many years after the violation since
by the Federal Act crimes involving capital punishment or life imprisonment
are excluded,23 and a large portion of other offenses would be barred by the
three year Statute of LimitationsY2 In addition, the Act clearly places it
within the discretion of the Attorney-General as to whether the offender
should be proceeded against as a juvenile.2 5  The reasonable assumption is
that he would do so in a proper case. To construe the statute otherwise, the
court finds, might allow the indictment or trial to be delayed to the prejudice
of the offender thereby nullifying the purpose of the Act; that is, the recog-
nition that one under eighteen years of age does not have mature judgment
and should not be compelled to bear the criminal stigma all his life due to a
youthful violation.
The analysis of the problem presented in the instant case follows closely
the basic purpose of the Juvenile Delinquency Act, a purpose of reform
rather than punishment, and the recognition that a juvenile offense remains
just that regardless of the passage of time. Revision of the Juvenile Acts
in conformity with those statutes which change the common law,20 making
a juvenile offense delinquency and not a crime, would enlighten and further
the true purpose of the Acts.
INSURANCE - CONSTRUCTION OF WAR EXCLUSION
CLAUSE - KOREAN ACTION
Action to recover on a life insurance policy which provided for the pay-
ment of double indemnity for accidental death except if insured was engaged
in military, air or naval services in time of war. Held, the Korean action is
at most an undeclared war. Since the tenn "war" is ambiguous, the policy
must be construed in favor of the insured. Harding v. Pennsylvania Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 90 A.2d 589 (Pa. 1952).'
The exemption clause used in this policy depends not only upon the
status of the individual, but also upon the status of the country when death
occurred. Where such a clause is used, merely "entering into" military
service in time of war is sufficient to terminate the double indemnity provi-
23. 62 STAT. 857 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1951).
24. 62 STAT. 828 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1951) (does not run on capital offenses).
25. 62 STAT. 857 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1951), Barnes v. Pescor, 68 F. Supp.
127 (W.D. Mo. 1946), appeal dismissed 158 F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1946).
26. N.Y. Dom. REL. Cr. AcT. § 61.
1. See also Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1952) (de-
cided on the same day).
